8f6b2a761b
zod field schemas in settingsSchema.ts replace setSettings' bespoke per-key switch: parse → skip-on-fail → store, side effects (secret encryption, launch-at-startup sync) kept in settings.ts. sanitizeOptions extracted to settingsOptions.ts to break the import cycle; backup import flows through the same schema. Field-by-field parity pinned in test/settingsSchema.test.ts (15 tests); full suite unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
225 lines
9.9 KiB
TypeScript
225 lines
9.9 KiB
TypeScript
import { app, safeStorage } from 'electron'
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import Store from 'electron-store'
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import { RENAMED_SETTINGS_KEYS } from './settingsMigration'
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import { parseSettingsField } from './settingsSchema'
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import { sanitizeOptions } from './settingsOptions'
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import { logger } from './logger'
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import { ACCENT_COLORS, DEFAULT_SETTINGS, type Settings, type DownloadOptions } from '@shared/ipc'
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// The electron-store defaults are the canonical DEFAULT_SETTINGS from the shared
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// contract — single-sourced so the renderer FALLBACK and the preview mock can't
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// drift from main (C1). The rationale for individual defaults (SR1/SR2/SR3) lives
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// alongside DEFAULT_SETTINGS in shared/ipc.ts.
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const DEFAULTS: Settings = DEFAULT_SETTINGS
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/**
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* Sync the OS "run at sign-in" entry with the launchAtStartup setting. Called at
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* startup and whenever the toggle changes. On Windows this writes/removes a
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* per-user registry Run entry — no admin needed, matching the app's no-elevation
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* stance. Best-effort: a failure here just means the toggle didn't take effect.
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*/
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export function applyLaunchAtStartup(enabled: boolean): void {
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try {
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app.setLoginItemSettings({ openAtLogin: enabled })
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} catch {
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/* non-fatal — e.g. unsupported platform */
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}
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}
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// sanitizeOptions moved to settingsOptions.ts (CC9) so the field schemas can
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// reuse it without an import cycle; re-imported above for the legacy-file
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// migration below.
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// Constructed lazily — electron-store needs app paths. (`userData` resolves
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// pre-ready too, which the W15 hardware-acceleration gate in index.ts relies on.)
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let store: Store<Settings> | null = null
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function getStore(): Store<Settings> {
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if (!store) {
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store = new Store<Settings>({ name: 'settings', defaults: DEFAULTS })
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// CC1 key-rename migration: move any legacy key still on disk to its new
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// name, once. `has()` reports defaults as present, so probe the raw store
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// object instead; idempotent because the old key is deleted afterwards.
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const raw = store.store as unknown as Record<string, unknown>
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const legacy = RENAMED_SETTINGS_KEYS.filter(([oldKey]) => oldKey in raw)
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if (legacy.length > 0) {
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const untyped = store as unknown as {
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set(k: string, v: unknown): void
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delete(k: string): void
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}
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for (const [oldKey, newKey] of legacy) {
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untyped.set(newKey, raw[oldKey])
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untyped.delete(oldKey)
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}
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}
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}
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return store
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}
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// Decrypted-settings cache — avoids repeated DPAPI calls on hot paths such as
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// buildCommand, the maxConcurrent check, completion notify, and the system-theme
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// bridge (PERF1). Invalidated by every setSettings write and by the one-time
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// migrateSecretsAtRest so callers always see the current values.
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let cachedSettings: Settings | null = null
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// --- Credential encryption at rest ------------------------------------------
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// proxy / youtubePoToken / updateToken can carry secrets (a proxy password, API
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// tokens). They're stored encrypted via Electron safeStorage (DPAPI on Windows)
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// so a leaked settings.json doesn't expose them. They're decrypted before
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// reaching the renderer; backup export strips them entirely (see backup.ts, M22).
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// Exported so backup.ts shares this one list rather than keeping a parallel copy.
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export const SECRET_KEYS = ['proxy', 'youtubePoToken', 'updateToken'] as const
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// Marks a value produced by encryptSecret, so a read can tell ciphertext from a
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// legacy plaintext value (written before encryption existed, or while safeStorage
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// was unavailable) and migrate it on the next write.
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const ENC_PREFIX = 'enc:v1:'
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/** Encrypt a secret for storage. Falls back to plaintext where safeStorage is unavailable. */
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function encryptSecret(plain: string): string {
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if (!plain) return ''
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try {
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if (safeStorage.isEncryptionAvailable()) {
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return ENC_PREFIX + safeStorage.encryptString(plain).toString('base64')
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}
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} catch {
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/* fall through — store plaintext, as it was before encryption existed */
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}
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// R7: OS encryption (DPAPI/keychain) is unavailable, so this credential is about
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// to be written in cleartext. Warn rather than fall back silently — a leaked
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// settings.json would then expose the proxy password / API token. (DPAPI is
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// effectively always present on Windows, so this should never fire in practice.)
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logger.warn('OS secret encryption unavailable — storing credential as plaintext')
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return plain
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}
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/** Decrypt a stored secret. Legacy plaintext is returned as-is; an undecryptable blob → ''. */
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function decryptSecret(stored: string): string {
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if (!stored.startsWith(ENC_PREFIX)) return stored
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try {
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return safeStorage.decryptString(Buffer.from(stored.slice(ENC_PREFIX.length), 'base64'))
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} catch {
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// Different user/machine or a corrupt blob — drop it rather than surface
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// ciphertext into the UI or onto a yt-dlp command line.
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return ''
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}
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}
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/** A copy of settings with the credential fields decrypted for in-process use. */
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function withDecryptedSecrets(raw: Settings): Settings {
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const out = { ...raw }
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for (const key of SECRET_KEYS) out[key] = decryptSecret(raw[key] ?? '')
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return out
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}
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/**
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* One-time (per launch) migration: re-store any credential still held as legacy
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* plaintext as ciphertext. Lets settings files written before at-rest encryption
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* get protected without a write on the hot getSettings() path. No-op when there's
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* nothing to migrate or safeStorage is unavailable.
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*/
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export function migrateSecretsAtRest(): void {
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let available = false
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try {
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available = safeStorage.isEncryptionAvailable()
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} catch {
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return
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}
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if (!available) return
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const s = getStore()
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for (const key of SECRET_KEYS) {
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const raw = s.get(key) ?? ''
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if (raw && !raw.startsWith(ENC_PREFIX)) s.set(key, encryptSecret(raw))
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}
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cachedSettings = null
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}
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export function getSettings(): Settings {
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if (cachedSettings) return cachedSettings
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const s = getStore()
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// getSettings() is on hot paths (buildCommand, notification checks, the system-
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// theme bridge, several IPC handlers). electron-store writes to disk on every
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// `set`, so only write when something actually changed — otherwise this churns
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// the settings file on every read. (audit P1)
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const cur = s.store
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// videoFolder/audioFolder are intentionally left blank by default — an empty value
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// routes that kind into Documents\Video / Documents\Audio (see buildCommand).
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// Only an explicit user choice (Settings → folders) overrides that.
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// Migrate settings files that predate downloadOptions (or hold a partial one),
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// but only persist when sanitizing actually altered the stored value.
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const sanitized = sanitizeOptions(cur.downloadOptions)
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if (!downloadOptionsEqual(sanitized, cur.downloadOptions)) {
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s.set('downloadOptions', sanitized)
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}
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// Coerce an accentColor left over from a renamed/removed preset (e.g. an old
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// 'toffee' or 'indigo' default) onto the current default, so it resolves cleanly.
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if (!(ACCENT_COLORS as readonly string[]).includes(cur.accentColor)) {
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s.set('accentColor', DEFAULTS.accentColor)
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}
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// Migrate the legacy audio-quality label 'Best (MP3)' to the format-agnostic
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// 'Best' so the dropdown matches and the label no longer names a format (M18).
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if (cur.defaultAudioQuality === 'Best (MP3)') {
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s.set('defaultAudioQuality', 'Best')
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}
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// Hand callers (and, via IPC, the renderer) plaintext credentials — they're
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// only encrypted on disk (see withDecryptedSecrets / encryptSecret).
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cachedSettings = withDecryptedSecrets(s.store)
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return cachedSettings
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}
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/** Shallow structural equality for DownloadOptions (sponsorBlockCategories compared by value). */
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function downloadOptionsEqual(a: DownloadOptions, b: unknown): boolean {
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if (!b || typeof b !== 'object') return false
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const o = b as Partial<DownloadOptions>
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const keys = Object.keys(a) as (keyof DownloadOptions)[]
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for (const k of keys) {
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if (k === 'sponsorBlockCategories') {
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const av = a[k]
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const bv = o[k]
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if (!Array.isArray(bv) || av.length !== bv.length) return false
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for (let i = 0; i < av.length; i++) if (av[i] !== bv[i]) return false
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} else if (a[k] !== o[k]) {
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return false
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}
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}
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return true
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}
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// Validate each key before persisting — the renderer is the only caller today,
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// but settings flow into process spawning (maxConcurrent) and the native window
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// background (theme), so an out-of-range or malformed value shouldn't get stored.
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export function setSettings(partial: Partial<Settings>): Settings {
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const s = getStore()
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try {
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applySettings(s, partial)
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} catch (e) {
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// R5: a write failure (disk full, read-only profile) must not crash the IPC
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// handler or surface as an unhandled rejection. Log it; getSettings() below
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// returns the store's ACTUAL persisted state, so the renderer's reconciliation
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// (M34) reflects what truly saved instead of the optimistic value.
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logger.error('settings write failed', e)
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}
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cachedSettings = null
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return getSettings()
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}
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function applySettings(s: Store<Settings>, partial: Partial<Settings>): void {
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for (const key of Object.keys(partial) as (keyof Settings)[]) {
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const value = partial[key]
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if (value === undefined) continue
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// One schema layer validates AND coerces every field (CC9) — the parsed
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// output is exactly what gets stored; a failed parse skips the key so the
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// stored value stays. Side effects that don't belong in a pure schema stay
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// here: credential fields are encrypted at rest (see encryptSecret; they're
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// stripped from backup exports via SECRET_KEYS), and launchAtStartup syncs
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// the OS run-at-sign-in entry.
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const parsed = parseSettingsField(key, value)
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if (!parsed.ok) continue
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if (SECRET_KEYS.includes(key as (typeof SECRET_KEYS)[number])) {
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s.set(key, encryptSecret(parsed.value as string) as Settings[typeof key])
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} else {
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s.set(key, parsed.value)
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}
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if (key === 'launchAtStartup') applyLaunchAtStartup(parsed.value as boolean)
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}
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}
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