import { app, safeStorage } from 'electron' import Store from 'electron-store' import { RENAMED_SETTINGS_KEYS } from './settingsMigration' import { parseSettingsField } from './settingsSchema' import { sanitizeOptions } from './settingsOptions' import { logger } from './logger' import { ACCENT_COLORS, DEFAULT_SETTINGS, type Settings, type DownloadOptions } from '@shared/ipc' // The electron-store defaults are the canonical DEFAULT_SETTINGS from the shared // contract — single-sourced so the renderer FALLBACK and the preview mock can't // drift from main (C1). The rationale for individual defaults (SR1/SR2/SR3) lives // alongside DEFAULT_SETTINGS in shared/ipc.ts. const DEFAULTS: Settings = DEFAULT_SETTINGS /** * Sync the OS "run at sign-in" entry with the launchAtStartup setting. Called at * startup and whenever the toggle changes. On Windows this writes/removes a * per-user registry Run entry — no admin needed, matching the app's no-elevation * stance. Best-effort: a failure here just means the toggle didn't take effect. */ export function applyLaunchAtStartup(enabled: boolean): void { try { app.setLoginItemSettings({ openAtLogin: enabled }) } catch { /* non-fatal — e.g. unsupported platform */ } } // sanitizeOptions moved to settingsOptions.ts (CC9) so the field schemas can // reuse it without an import cycle; re-imported above for the legacy-file // migration below. // Constructed lazily — electron-store needs app paths. (`userData` resolves // pre-ready too, which the W15 hardware-acceleration gate in index.ts relies on.) let store: Store | null = null function getStore(): Store { if (!store) { store = new Store({ name: 'settings', defaults: DEFAULTS }) // CC1 key-rename migration: move any legacy key still on disk to its new // name, once. `has()` reports defaults as present, so probe the raw store // object instead; idempotent because the old key is deleted afterwards. const raw = store.store as unknown as Record const legacy = RENAMED_SETTINGS_KEYS.filter(([oldKey]) => oldKey in raw) if (legacy.length > 0) { const untyped = store as unknown as { set(k: string, v: unknown): void delete(k: string): void } for (const [oldKey, newKey] of legacy) { untyped.set(newKey, raw[oldKey]) untyped.delete(oldKey) } } } return store } // Decrypted-settings cache — avoids repeated DPAPI calls on hot paths such as // buildCommand, the maxConcurrent check, completion notify, and the system-theme // bridge (PERF1). Invalidated by every setSettings write and by the one-time // migrateSecretsAtRest so callers always see the current values. let cachedSettings: Settings | null = null // --- Credential encryption at rest ------------------------------------------ // proxy / youtubePoToken can carry secrets (a proxy password, API tokens). // They're stored encrypted via Electron safeStorage (DPAPI on Windows) so a // leaked settings.json doesn't expose them. They're decrypted before reaching // the renderer; backup export strips them entirely (see backup.ts, M22). // Exported so backup.ts shares this one list rather than keeping a parallel copy. export const SECRET_KEYS = ['proxy', 'youtubePoToken'] as const // Marks a value produced by encryptSecret, so a read can tell ciphertext from a // legacy plaintext value (written before encryption existed, or while safeStorage // was unavailable) and migrate it on the next write. const ENC_PREFIX = 'enc:v1:' /** Encrypt a secret for storage. Falls back to plaintext where safeStorage is unavailable. */ function encryptSecret(plain: string): string { if (!plain) return '' try { if (safeStorage.isEncryptionAvailable()) { return ENC_PREFIX + safeStorage.encryptString(plain).toString('base64') } } catch { /* fall through — store plaintext, as it was before encryption existed */ } // R7: OS encryption (DPAPI/keychain) is unavailable, so this credential is about // to be written in cleartext. Warn rather than fall back silently — a leaked // settings.json would then expose the proxy password / API token. (DPAPI is // effectively always present on Windows, so this should never fire in practice.) logger.warn('OS secret encryption unavailable — storing credential as plaintext') return plain } /** Decrypt a stored secret. Legacy plaintext is returned as-is; an undecryptable blob → ''. */ function decryptSecret(stored: string): string { if (!stored.startsWith(ENC_PREFIX)) return stored try { return safeStorage.decryptString(Buffer.from(stored.slice(ENC_PREFIX.length), 'base64')) } catch { // Different user/machine or a corrupt blob — drop it rather than surface // ciphertext into the UI or onto a yt-dlp command line. return '' } } /** A copy of settings with the credential fields decrypted for in-process use. */ function withDecryptedSecrets(raw: Settings): Settings { const out = { ...raw } for (const key of SECRET_KEYS) out[key] = decryptSecret(raw[key] ?? '') return out } /** * One-time (per launch) migration: re-store any credential still held as legacy * plaintext as ciphertext. Lets settings files written before at-rest encryption * get protected without a write on the hot getSettings() path. No-op when there's * nothing to migrate or safeStorage is unavailable. */ export function migrateSecretsAtRest(): void { let available = false try { available = safeStorage.isEncryptionAvailable() } catch { return } if (!available) return const s = getStore() for (const key of SECRET_KEYS) { const raw = s.get(key) ?? '' if (raw && !raw.startsWith(ENC_PREFIX)) s.set(key, encryptSecret(raw)) } cachedSettings = null } export function getSettings(): Settings { if (cachedSettings) return cachedSettings const s = getStore() // getSettings() is on hot paths (buildCommand, notification checks, the system- // theme bridge, several IPC handlers). electron-store writes to disk on every // `set`, so only write when something actually changed — otherwise this churns // the settings file on every read. (audit P1) const cur = s.store // videoFolder/audioFolder are intentionally left blank by default — an empty value // routes that kind into Documents\Video / Documents\Audio (see buildCommand). // Only an explicit user choice (Settings → folders) overrides that. // Migrate settings files that predate downloadOptions (or hold a partial one), // but only persist when sanitizing actually altered the stored value. const sanitized = sanitizeOptions(cur.downloadOptions) if (!downloadOptionsEqual(sanitized, cur.downloadOptions)) { s.set('downloadOptions', sanitized) } // Coerce an accentColor left over from a renamed/removed preset (e.g. an old // 'toffee' or 'indigo' default) onto the current default, so it resolves cleanly. if (!(ACCENT_COLORS as readonly string[]).includes(cur.accentColor)) { s.set('accentColor', DEFAULTS.accentColor) } // Migrate the legacy audio-quality label 'Best (MP3)' to the format-agnostic // 'Best' so the dropdown matches and the label no longer names a format (M18). if (cur.defaultAudioQuality === 'Best (MP3)') { s.set('defaultAudioQuality', 'Best') } // Hand callers (and, via IPC, the renderer) plaintext credentials — they're // only encrypted on disk (see withDecryptedSecrets / encryptSecret). cachedSettings = withDecryptedSecrets(s.store) return cachedSettings } /** Shallow structural equality for DownloadOptions (sponsorBlockCategories compared by value). */ function downloadOptionsEqual(a: DownloadOptions, b: unknown): boolean { if (!b || typeof b !== 'object') return false const o = b as Partial const keys = Object.keys(a) as (keyof DownloadOptions)[] for (const k of keys) { if (k === 'sponsorBlockCategories') { const av = a[k] const bv = o[k] if (!Array.isArray(bv) || av.length !== bv.length) return false for (let i = 0; i < av.length; i++) if (av[i] !== bv[i]) return false } else if (a[k] !== o[k]) { return false } } return true } // Validate each key before persisting — the renderer is the only caller today, // but settings flow into process spawning (maxConcurrent) and the native window // background (theme), so an out-of-range or malformed value shouldn't get stored. export function setSettings(partial: Partial): Settings { const s = getStore() try { applySettings(s, partial) } catch (e) { // R5: a write failure (disk full, read-only profile) must not crash the IPC // handler or surface as an unhandled rejection. Log it; getSettings() below // returns the store's ACTUAL persisted state, so the renderer's reconciliation // (M34) reflects what truly saved instead of the optimistic value. logger.error('settings write failed', e) } cachedSettings = null return getSettings() } function applySettings(s: Store, partial: Partial): void { for (const key of Object.keys(partial) as (keyof Settings)[]) { const value = partial[key] if (value === undefined) continue // One schema layer validates AND coerces every field (CC9) — the parsed // output is exactly what gets stored; a failed parse skips the key so the // stored value stays. Side effects that don't belong in a pure schema stay // here: credential fields are encrypted at rest (see encryptSecret; they're // stripped from backup exports via SECRET_KEYS), and launchAtStartup syncs // the OS run-at-sign-in entry. const parsed = parseSettingsField(key, value) if (!parsed.ok) continue if (SECRET_KEYS.includes(key as (typeof SECRET_KEYS)[number])) { s.set(key, encryptSecret(parsed.value as string) as Settings[typeof key]) } else { s.set(key, parsed.value) } if (key === 'launchAtStartup') applyLaunchAtStartup(parsed.value as boolean) } }