security: harden command exec, IPC, deep-link, cookies, and persistence

Seven-tier security audit of the main process, each finding fixed with a
regression test. Typecheck (node + web) clean; unit tests 106 -> 140.

- Tier 1 (command exec/argv): allowlist the yt-dlp --update-to channel
  (blocks arbitrary-binary-install RCE); gate per-download extraArgs behind
  the customCommandEnabled consent flag in main (blocks --exec RCE); resolve
  taskkill/schtasks by absolute System32 path; validate per-download
  outputDir; normalize the URL in assertHttpUrl and use it at every spawn.
- Tier 2 (input validation): fix isSafeFilenameTemplate drive-relative
  ('C:foo') and Windows dotted-'..' traversal bypasses; percent-encode the
  untrusted id in entryUrl; catch reserved device names with extensions in
  sanitizeDirSegment.
- Tier 3 (fs/backup): drop malformed template rows in importBackup;
  normalize deep-link URLs via assertHttpUrl.
- Tier 4 (cookies): confine the sign-in window's navigations/popups to web
  URLs (recursively) and deny all web permissions on its session.
- Tier 5 (deep-link/argv): bound the .url file read to 64 KB; match the
  aerofetch:// scheme case-insensitively.
- Tier 6 (Electron window): deny camera/mic/geolocation/USB/HID/serial/
  Bluetooth permissions on the app window.
- Tier 7 (network/persistence): restrict the watched-source RSS fetch to
  youtube.com feed URLs (SSRF guard); complete isValidSource validation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
2026-06-24 08:04:19 -04:00
parent 831d0a7dc2
commit 3536626a8a
22 changed files with 623 additions and 84 deletions
+9 -3
View File
@@ -10,17 +10,23 @@
* (Call sites also pass `--` before the positional URL as defence in depth.)
*
* Throws a user-friendly Error on anything that isn't an http(s) URL.
*
* Returns the parser-NORMALISED URL (`u.href`), not the raw input (audit F5).
* The WHATWG URL parser silently tolerates interior tab/newline characters and
* leading C0 control bytes (which `String.trim()` does not strip), so returning
* the raw string could hand a downstream consumer — argv, or the sign-in
* window's loadURL — a value subtly different from the one actually validated.
* Emitting `u.href` guarantees callers use exactly the URL that passed the check.
*/
export function assertHttpUrl(raw: string): string {
const trimmed = (raw ?? '').trim()
let u: URL
try {
u = new URL(trimmed)
u = new URL((raw ?? '').trim())
} catch {
throw new Error('That doesnt look like a valid URL.')
}
if (u.protocol !== 'http:' && u.protocol !== 'https:') {
throw new Error('Only http and https links are supported.')
}
return trimmed
return u.href
}