security: harden command exec, IPC, deep-link, cookies, and persistence
Seven-tier security audit of the main process, each finding fixed with a
regression test. Typecheck (node + web) clean; unit tests 106 -> 140.
- Tier 1 (command exec/argv): allowlist the yt-dlp --update-to channel
(blocks arbitrary-binary-install RCE); gate per-download extraArgs behind
the customCommandEnabled consent flag in main (blocks --exec RCE); resolve
taskkill/schtasks by absolute System32 path; validate per-download
outputDir; normalize the URL in assertHttpUrl and use it at every spawn.
- Tier 2 (input validation): fix isSafeFilenameTemplate drive-relative
('C:foo') and Windows dotted-'..' traversal bypasses; percent-encode the
untrusted id in entryUrl; catch reserved device names with extensions in
sanitizeDirSegment.
- Tier 3 (fs/backup): drop malformed template rows in importBackup;
normalize deep-link URLs via assertHttpUrl.
- Tier 4 (cookies): confine the sign-in window's navigations/popups to web
URLs (recursively) and deny all web permissions on its session.
- Tier 5 (deep-link/argv): bound the .url file read to 64 KB; match the
aerofetch:// scheme case-insensitively.
- Tier 6 (Electron window): deny camera/mic/geolocation/USB/HID/serial/
Bluetooth permissions on the app window.
- Tier 7 (network/persistence): restrict the watched-source RSS fetch to
youtube.com feed URLs (SSRF guard); complete isValidSource validation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
+21
-1
@@ -34,7 +34,9 @@ export interface RawEntry {
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export function entryUrl(e: RawEntry): string | null {
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const cand = e.url || e.webpage_url
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if (cand && /^https?:\/\//i.test(cand)) return cand
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if (e.id) return `https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=${e.id}`
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// e.id is untrusted JSON from yt-dlp, so percent-encode it rather than splicing
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// it raw into the query string (audit T2). A normal 11-char id is unaffected.
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if (e.id) return `https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=${encodeURIComponent(e.id)}`
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return null
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}
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@@ -138,6 +140,24 @@ export function buildFeedUrl(kind: SourceKind, ytId: string | undefined): string
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return `https://www.youtube.com/feeds/videos.xml?${param}=${encodeURIComponent(ytId)}`
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}
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/**
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* Guard for the watched-source RSS pre-check (audit T7). The only feed AeroFetch
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* ever builds is a YouTube videos.xml feed (see buildFeedUrl), so the sync refuses
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* to fetch anything else — this keeps a hand-edited / corrupted sources.json from
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* pointing fetch() at an internal service, a cloud-metadata endpoint, or any other
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* arbitrary host (SSRF). Requires https, the youtube.com host (www optional), and
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* the exact feed path; the channel_id/playlist_id query is free.
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*/
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export function isYouTubeFeedUrl(url: string): boolean {
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try {
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const u = new URL(url)
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const host = u.hostname.replace(/^www\./i, '').toLowerCase()
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return u.protocol === 'https:' && host === 'youtube.com' && u.pathname === '/feeds/videos.xml'
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} catch {
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return false
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}
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}
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/** Extract the video ids from a YouTube RSS/Atom feed body (the <yt:videoId> tags). */
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export function parseRssVideoIds(xml: string): string[] {
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const ids: string[] = []
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